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III. THE PEOPLE 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
RACE AND CRIME 
PAUL BUTLER∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article considers the evolution of thinking about criminal justice 
and racial justice over the last one hundred years. 
If I were writing about race and crime in 1910, the year the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology was founded,1 the problem that I would 
have focused on would be lynchings, which were sometimes an extra-legal 
response to African-American criminal suspects (and sometimes just 
random mob violence).  The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) was created the year before the Journal.2  The 
NAACP began as a response to the domestic terrorism of rampant 
lynchings, which were mainly in the South but all over the country.3  Most 
of the victims were African-American but there were Latino, Jewish, and 
immigrant victims as well.4  Thus the main race and crime problem, as 
                                                          
∗ Carville Dickinson Benson Research Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty 
Development, George Washington University Law School.  I thank the other participants in 
the symposium for helpful comments.  Aaron J. Sussman provided exemplary research 
assistance.  An early draft of this Article was presented at a faculty workshop at DePaul 
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Tuerkheimer. 
1 Jennifer Devroye, The Rise and Fall of the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 7 (2010).  The Institute established the Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology the following year.  Id. at 8. 
2 GILBERT JONAS, FREEDOM’S SWORD: THE NAACP AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RACISM 
IN AMERICA, 1909-1969 11 (2005). 
3 Id. at 111 (“During its first two decades . . . the NAACP’s solitary political focus . . . 
was the campaign to outlaw lynching nationally.”). 
4 W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-
1930, 91, 100 (1993). 
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identified by the first significant civil rights organization, was black 
victimization by white criminals. 
Other race and crime problems I would have focused on in 1910 
include de jure discrimination against African Americans, including their 
exclusion from juries.5  I would have been concerned about wrongful 
convictions, especially in death penalty cases when there was a black 
suspect and a white victim.6  I probably would have mentioned the related 
concern of lack of effective assistance of counsel.7  I would have 
complained about the way that the police enforced vagrancy laws.8  If 
punishment came up outside of the death penalty context, there might be 
some discussion of chain-gangs or conditions in segregated “colored only” 
prisons.9  I would have been concerned about quasi-scientific responses to 
                                                          
5 As a result of the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), de jure 
segregation was still considered constitutionally valid.  Even de jure racial segregation in 
housing had been upheld by state courts until invalidated in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 
60 (1917).  Of course, the doctrine of “separate but equal” was not struck down completely 
until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  See also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY 39-43 (2004) (explaining that, despite the holding in Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303 (1880), which prohibited de jure exclusion of African-American jurors, 
subsequent decisions that rejected challenges to disenfranchisement allowed jurisdictions to 
exclude African-American jurors by selecting jurors through voter lists, since few blacks 
were registered to vote). 
6 See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT; SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL 
ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22-27 (1932) (detailing the story of Payne Boyd, an African-
American man who, as a result of mistaken identity, was wrongly arrested and convicted for 
a white man’s murder, even though thirty-one witnesses testified that the defendant was not 
Cleveland Boyd, the black man whom both parties admitted did commit the crime); see also 
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 137-43 (2002) (explaining 
that in some southern states, the death penalty could be used to punish some crimes such as 
arson, murder, and robbery, but only if the defendant was black, and, in the case of rape and 
kidnapping, only if the victim was white). 
7 The Sixth Amendment, which today guarantees indigent defendants the right to 
effective counsel, had not yet been incorporated; thus, not only was effective assistance of 
counsel not constitutionally guaranteed, but, in state prosecutions, indigent defendants 
practically had no right to counsel whatsoever.  See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 
(1942). 
8 See also William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 13 
(1960).  See generally Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: 
Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1984). 
9 See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL 
OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 57-62 (1996) (describing the use of incarcerated African Americans as 
cheap labor); Nancy A. Ozimek, Note, Reinstitution of the Chain Gang: A Historical and 
Constitutional Analysis, 6 B.U. PUB. INT‘L L.J. 753, 758-63 (1997) (describing the history of 
chain gangs and their disproportionate impact on African Americans). 
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criminality like eugenics and forced sterilization,10 and worried about their 
application to African Americans.11 
A few years down the road from 1910, as formal police departments 
spread about the country, I certainly would have written about the problem 
of police brutality, and the widespread antipathy that blacks and police—
two very distinct groups—had for each other.12 
If I had spoken to a conference of progressives, say the members of the 
NAACP, which from its inception included many whites,13 I would also 
have mentioned the need for more black police officers.  The suggestion 
that there needed to be more African-American prosecutors and judges 
would have been seen as so pie-in-the-sky as to be almost silly.  In 1910 my 
great-grandfather cleaned outhouses for a living and, about twenty years 
later, my grandfather had one of the best jobs a black man could have—he 
was a Pullman porter. 
That was then, this is now.  I am a law professor.  The President of the 
United States is an African-American man.  And there are almost one 
million African-American people in prison.14  The major race and crime 
problems of our time are the mass incarceration of African Americans and 
the extraordinary disparities between blacks and whites in the criminal 
justice system. 
The fundamental paradox is that, in 2010, while evidence of racial 
progress is everywhere, racial disparities in criminal justice have never been 
greater.  Nearly one in three young black men has a criminal case: he’s 
either locked up, on probation or parole, or awaiting trial.15  If we look at 
black-white racial disparities in education,16 housing,17 health care,18 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding forced sterilization of Carrie 
Buck, an alleged “feeble minded” woman). 
11 EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 165-69 
(1995) (describing popularity of eugenics movements in the Deep South). 
12 MARILYNN S. JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW 
YORK CITY 57-86 (2003) (describing race riots and police brutality in New York City’s 
increasingly black “Tenderloin” district). 
13 JONAS, supra note 2, at 11. 
14 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 
2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.16 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf. 
15 MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1-5 (1995), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_youngblack_5yrslater.pdf. 
16 In 2007, the dropout rate for white students was 6.1%; for African Americans, it was 
11.5%.  NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF 
EDUCATION 2009 182 tbl.A-20-1 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/ 
pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2009081. 
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employment,19 the ratio is usually 2:1 or 3:1.  So, for example, the black 
unemployment rate is often twice the white unemployment rate.20  Those 
disparities have either remained constant over the last one hundred years, or 
have gotten better.21  Right now the black-white incarceration disparity is 
7:1.22  Over the last several decades, as African Americans presumably 
have had more and more opportunities, have been freed of de jure 
discrimination, and as overt racial prejudice has become socially 
stigmatized, the black-white disparity in incarceration has risen.23  How can 
this be explained? 
                                                                                                                                       
17 Though African Americans constitute less than one-sixth of the total population, they 
make up one half of the homeless population.  See Daniel White & Charles Crawford, 
African American Males and Homelessness: Voices from the Shelter, in 1 HOMELESSNESS IN 
AMERICA 189-92 (Robert Hartmann McNamara ed., 2008). 
18 African Americans are more than twice as likely as white Americans to die of 
diabetes, and in their first year of life, 108.14% more African-American infants die than do 
white infants.  See Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an Unjust Health 
Care System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 140-43 
(1993). 
19 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND 
ETHNICITY, 2008 3-5 (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2008.pdf. 
20 In 2008, the unemployment rate for African Americans was 10.1%.  The 
unemployment rate for whites was 5.2%.  Id. at 5 tbl.1. 
21 See, e.g., NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 16, at 183 tbl.A-20-2 
(showing that the dropout rate for black students has dropped from 19.1% in 1980 to 8.4%  
in 2007). 
22 In 2008, about 846,000 of the approximately 38 million African Americans were in 
jail or prison.  In contrast, about 712,500 of the approximately 228 million white Americans 
were similarly incarcerated.  That’s one in forty-five blacks, and about one in three hundred 
and twenty whites.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008—
STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.16 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR 
ESTIMATES, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&-geo_id= 
01000US&-qr_name=ACS_2008_1YR_G00_DP5. 
23 In 1950, the incarceration rate (number incarcerated per every 100,000 persons) was 
86 for whites and 406 for blacks; blacks were almost five times more likely to be locked up 
than whites.  See MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984 65 tbl.3-31 (1986); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1951 8 (1951), available at http://www2.census.gov/ 
prod2/statcomp/documents/1951-02.pdf.  However, in 2008, the incarceration rate was 360 
for whites and 2,461 for blacks; blacks are now  almost seven times more likely to be locked 
up than whites; see HEATHER C. WEST, & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 
2008 - STATISTICAL TABLES, 17 (2009); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY, tbl.B02001, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-
geo_id=01000US&-ds_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_&-mt_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G2000 
_B02001.  Therefore, since 1950, the incarceration rate for whites has quadrupled, but the 
rate for blacks has more than sextupled. 
2010] ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF RACE AND CRIME 1047 
II. THE NEW JIM CROW 
There are two competing narratives about race and criminal justice 
over the last one hundred years (or, more accurately, the last one hundred 
and fifty years, since the end of slavery).  One narrative is that mass 
incarceration is the “New Jim Crow.”24  Under this analysis, slavery, de jure 
segregation, and now mass incarceration serve many of the same functions 
and have many of the same effects.25  There are more blacks in the criminal 
justice system now (incarcerated, on probation or parole, awaiting trial) 
than were slaves in 1850.26  In 2006, one in nine young black men were in 
prison, and black men were eight times more likely to be in jail or prison 
than white men.27  More black men are barred from voting than when the 
Fifteenth Amendment was ratified.28 
Michelle Alexander’s book, The New Jim Crow, advances the theory 
that, in today’s “colorblind[]” era, police, prosecutors, judges, and 
legislators use criminal history as a proxy for race, thereby establishing (or 
maintaining) a racial caste system.29  During the Jim Crow era, blacks were 
discriminated against, disenfranchised, excluded from juries, prevented 
from bringing legal challenges, and denied other civil, political, and legal 
rights.30  The same can be said today about felons, a disproportionate 
number of whom are African-American.31  Alexander asserts that in the era 
of mass incarceration, a newly freed felon has “scarcely more rights, and 
arguably less respect, than a freed slave or a black person living ‘free’ in 
Mississippi at the height of Jim Crow.”32 
According to Alexander, the war on drugs is the primary tool in 
creating today’s caste system.  Since the war on drugs began approximately 
thirty years ago, the U.S. penal population has almost sextupled, growing 
from around 300,000 to two million; more than half of these incarcerations 
                                                          
24 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
25 Id. at 185-95; see also DEAD PREZ, Behind Enemy Lines, on LET’S GET FREE (Loud 
Records 2000) (“Behind enemy lines, my niggas is cellmates. / Most of the youth never 
escape the jail fate. / Super maximum camps will advance their game plan / to keep us in the 
hands of the man. Locked up.”). 
26 ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 271 n.7 (citing PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: 
THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2009); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE SEVENTH 
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1850 ix tbl.1 (1853)). 
27 ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 98. 
28 Id. at 175. 
29 Id. at 2. 
30 Id. at 185-95. 
31 Id. at 97, 185-95. 
32 Id. at 138. 
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were drug convictions.33  Today, about half of a million people are in jail or 
prison for a drug offense; this is more than a ten-fold increase from 1980.34  
As a result, the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world 
by far; we incarcerate 750 adults per 100,000, while Germany, for example, 
incarcerates 93 per 100,000.35  The incarceration rate has skyrocketed 
despite the fact that the rate of violent crimes is historically low.36 
The discriminatory results of the drug war are clear.  Three-fourths of 
those imprisoned for drug offenses are black or Latino.37  In seven states, 
80% to 90% of imprisoned drug offenders are black.38  Such disparities 
cannot be explained by disproportionate use of drugs by African 
Americans; blacks don’t use drugs more than any other group, and some 
studies have even found that they use them less.39 
Instead of a formally discriminatory legal regime under Jim Crow, the 
caste system of mass incarceration relies on the unchecked discretion of 
police officers and prosecutors.  Though all races use illegal drugs at similar 
rates, law enforcement officers target inner-city minorities; one study in 
Seattle showed that officers more frequently surveilled open-air drug 
markets even though most citizen complaints regarded suspected drug use 
in residences, that officers targeted a downtown drug market even though 
the frequency of transactions was higher in an outdoor drug market in a 
white neighborhood, that officers arrested black dealers far more often than 
white dealers even though white dealers were plainly visible, and that 
officers overwhelmingly focused on crack cocaine, preferred by the 
African-American community, even though more overdose deaths were the 
result of heroin use.40  The Supreme Court has contributed to this highly 
differential system.  Between 1982 and 1991, 90% of Supreme Court 
decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment as applied to narcotics were 
reversals in favor of the government.41  Frustrated, Justice Thurgood 
                                                          
33 Id. at 6. 
34 Id. at 59. 
35 Id. at 6. 
36 Id. at 99. 
37 Id. at 96-97. 
38 Id. at 96. 
39 Id. at 97 (citing NATI’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
MONITORING THE FUTURE: 1 NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975-1999: 
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS (2000)). 
40 Id. at 120-22, 124-25. 
41 Id. at 61 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J. 
dissenting)). 
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Marshall had to remind his colleagues that there is “no drug exception” to 
the Bill of Rights.42 
Similar statistics reveal racial disparities in police officers use of 
traffic stops; on the New Jersey Turnpike, where 15% of drivers are black, 
42% of stops, and 73% of arrests were of black motorists, even though 
whites were more likely to be found carrying illegal drugs in their 
vehicles.43 
Even though America’s laws must be formally colorblind, the 
Supreme Court has approved the practice of using race as a factor to 
determine whether an individual is sufficiently suspicious to investigate, at 
least in the context of immigration.44  Moreover, the Court has made it 
difficult to challenge discrimination other than in its extreme forms.  For 
example, the Court refused to grant relief to a death row inmate convicted 
in Georgia, where prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of cases 
involving blacks accused of killing whites but only 19% of cases involving 
whites accused of killing blacks.45  The Court held that an undeniable 
pattern of discrimination was not sufficient and that the Equal Protection 
Clause would be implicated only if a defendant could prove that the 
prosecutor, judge, or jury consciously discriminated against the defendant 
in his own particular case.46  Relying on this precedent, a subsequent 
Georgia Supreme Court decision upheld a statute allowing a judge to 
impose life imprisonment for a second drug offense, even though Georgia‘s 
prosecutors requested that the policy be applied against blacks sixteen times 
more often than against whites; 98.4% of persons discretionarily sentenced 
under the law were black.47  The Court has also made it practically 
impossible to ensure a fair jury of one’s peers; though the Court requires 
prosecutors to have a non-racially discriminatory justification for using a 
peremptory challenge,48 the Court has accepted clearly pretextual 
justifications, such as having “the longest hair of anybody on the panel by 
far,” or having a “mustache and goatee type beard,” which according to the 
prosecutor in question, “look[ed] suspicious” and made the person 
“appear[] not to be a good juror for that fact . . . .”49  The Court has even 
closed the door to a plaintiff’s fact-finding.  When the federal public 
                                                          
42 Id. at 60 (citing Skinner v. Ry Labor Executive’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
43 Id. at 131. 
44 Id. at 128-30 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)). 
45 Id. at 106-09 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 111-12 (referring to Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. 1995)). 
48 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
49 Id. at 120 (quoting Purkett v. Elm, 514. U.S. 765, 789 (1995)). 
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defenders in Los Angeles noticed that all of their crack defendants in the 
previous year were either black or Hispanic, they alleged selective 
enforcement and sought to acquire information regarding the prosecutors’ 
charging decisions; the Court refused to grant discovery, requiring the 
defenders to show solid proof of selective prosecution before being allowed 
to investigate for solid proof of selective prosecution.50 
Professor Alexander is not the first to compare the modern struggles of 
blacks to the Jim Crow era; similar rhetoric has consistently been used to 
criticize American criminal law, especially the war on drugs.  In 1999, 
former executive director of the ACLU Ira Glasser compared the drug laws 
not only to Jim Crow but also to the internment of Japanese-Americans 
during World War II.51  Like Alexander, Glasser blamed the drug war for 
discriminatory police tactics, such as racial profiling in the use of traffic 
stops and Terry stop-and-frisks.52  In 2001, the Temple Political and Civil 
Rights Law Review hosted an entire symposium titled “U.S. Drug Laws: 
The New Jim Crow?”53  In a 2002 article, Graham Boyd,54 the founder of 
                                                          
50 Id. at 113-15 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)). 
51 Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 703-04 
(2000). 
52 Id. at 709-11. 
53 Beverly Xaviera Watkins and Mindy Thompson Fullilove noted how, despite the 
recognition of the health dangers of the use of crack, particularly the spread of AIDS, the 
government failed to allocate resources or provide a sufficient government response.  
Beverly Xaviera Watkins & Mindy Thompson Fullilove, The Crack Epidemic and the 
Failure of Epidemic Response, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 377-83 (2001).  
Professor Diana Gordon examined change to drug laws, concluding that today's war on 
drugs is just another example of “a rear-guard action against full equality for racial 
minorities.”  Diana R. Gordon, Drug Policy and the Dangerous Classes: A Historical 
Overview, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 315, 320 (2001).  Professor Susan Frietsche 
examined policies highlighted in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), that 
required hospitals to perform a drug test on mothers of newborns; if the mother tested 
positive for drug use, they would be charged with distribution of drugs to a minor.  Susan 
Frietsche, Policing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 411 
(2001).  Amy Hirsch addressed how welfare reform strips poor, uneducated, and often 
homeless women of necessary welfare benefits.  Amy E. Hirsch, Bringing Back Shame: 
Women, Welfare Reform, and Criminal Justice, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 417, 419-
27 (2001).  Eric E. Sterling, President of The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, discussed 
the political background of the war on drugs, including politicians' exploitation of the death 
of college basketball sensation Len Bias to strengthen cocaine sentences.  Eric E. Sterling, 
Drug Laws and Thought Crime, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 327, 329-31 (2001).  
William H. Buckman and John Lamberth explained how police departments' drug courier 
profiles enable racial profiling in traffic stops.  William H. Buckman & John Lamberth, 
Challenging Racial Profiles: Attacking Jim Crow on the Interstate, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 387, 390-94 (2001).  J. Whyatt Mondesire compared felon disenfranchisement 
to Jim Crow era poll taxes.  J. Whyatt Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern 
Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 435 (2001).  Marc Mauer, Assistant 
Director of the Sentencing Project, highlighted the abuses in police and prosecutor 
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the ACLU’s Drug Policy Litigation Project, voiced a number of the same 
concerns addressed in Alexander’s book; he cites felon 
disenfranchisement,55 disparities in enforcement,56 prison labor,57 
revocation of government aid,58 and child custody revocation proceedings 
for mothers who show signs of drug use59 as signs that the drug war is the 
New Jim Crow. 
In the New Jim Crow analogy, police and prosecutors are the modern 
overseers.60  It is easy to caricature this narrative, and its exponents are 
quick to acknowledge that there are important differences between slaves, 
victims of legal segregation, and inmates.61  The “New Jim Crow” analysis, 
however, focuses on the striking similarities.  Both slavery and 
imprisonment, the argument goes, are caste defining and integral in the 
production of race.62  Both are institutions that are inextricable from white 
supremacy. 
III. THE CELEBRATORY TRADITION 
The competing narrative about race and crime is more optimistic.  The 
“celebratory tradition” was originally described by Professor Randall 
Kennedy as a form of racial apologetics.63  Here, I use the term in a non-
pejorative sense.  It is a way of identifying the concept that racial justice has 
been advanced in the last millennium and that the law has played an 
                                                                                                                                       
discretion.  Marc Mauer, Race, Drugs Laws, & Criminal Justice, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. REV. 321, 321-23 (2001).  Kurt Schmoke, former Mayor of Baltimore and current Dean of 
Howard Law School, discussed his strategy for ending the drug war and the crime problem 
at the same time: shifting publicly allocated funds from criminal justice to public health.  
Kurt Schmoke, Forging a New Consensus in the War on Drugs: Is It Possible?, 10 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 351, 356 (2001). 
54 Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV. 839 (2002). 
55 Id. at 843-45. 
56 Id. at 845-46. 
57 Id. at 848. 
58 Id. at 848-49. 
59 Id. at 847-48. 
60 KRS-ONE, Sound of da Police, on RETURN OF THE BOOM BAP (Jive Records 1993) 
(“The overseer rode around the plantation; / the [police] officer is off patrolling all the 
nation. / The overseer could stop you what you’re doing; / the officer will pull you over just 
when he’s pursuing. / The overseer had the right to get ill, / and if you fought back, the 
overseer had the right to kill; /the officer has the right to arrest, / and if you fight back they 
put a hole in your chest.”); IMMORTAL TECHNIQUE, You Never Know, on REVOLUTIONARY 
VOL. 2 (Viper Records 2003) (“[I] [e]nded up locked up like an animal for a year, / where 
the C.O.'s [correction officers] talk to you like they were the overseer.”).  
61 See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 195-208. 
62 Id. at 182-95. 
63 Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of 
Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1629 (1986). 
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important role in this advancement.  Professor Kennedy was critical of 
some constitutional scholars who he believed justified or ignored the 
Supreme Court’s failures in race cases.64  This inclination, Kennedy claims, 
arises from the pressure on legal scholars to provide “nationalistic self-
congratulation” in order to bestow upon the Court the appearance of 
legitimacy.65  In critiquing the celebratory tradition, Kennedy targeted the 
constitutional scholarship of Professor Benno Schmidt, particularly his 
work addressing the Court’s jurisprudence during the Progressive era.66 
Schmidt claimed, for example, that the Supreme Court’s peonage 
decisions, which invalidated statutes forcing persons who breached 
employment contracts to become indentured servants,67 effectively 
dismantled southern peonage and became “the most lasting of the White 
Court’s contributions to justice for black people, and among its greatest 
achievements.”68  Kennedy accused Schmidt of a gross exaggeration; the 
Court’s declarations plainly failed to end peonage, as many state officials 
defied the decisions and continued to apply the criminal law to acquire 
forced labor.69  Therefore, Kennedy argues, the White Court, which 
Schmidt claims was distinctly more progressive than other Courts and other 
branches of government at the time, “did not challenge the prevailing 
ideology in the Age of Segregation, but fit quite readily within it”; the 
Court continually upheld segregation, and the few progressive decisions 
issued by the Court were quickly and easily evaded through legislative 
subterfuge.70 
                                                          
64 Id. at 1622-27. 
65 Id. at 1659. 
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(1986); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost 
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1983); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., 
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Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and 
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 
82 COLUM. L. REV. 646 (1982); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The 
Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 3: Black Disfranchisement from the 
KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (1982)). 
67 See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 
(1911). 
68 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 66, at 820.  
69 Kennedy, supra note 64, at 1646-48. 
70 Id. at 1648-52. 
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Ironically, given his critique of Schmidt, Kennedy himself is the 
leading practitioner of the celebratory tradition in criminal law scholarship.  
His book, Race, Crime, and the Law, revels in the progress that he believes 
the United States has made on race and crime issues.71  In “(Color) Blind 
Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law,” a critique of Kennedy’s 
book, I noted that the book minimizes the law’s failures and exaggerates its 
achievements.72  Kennedy does not believe that racism remains a significant 
concern in American criminal justice. 
A celebrant like Kennedy, revisiting the list of problems that I would 
have focused on in 1910, would note that many of those problems have, to a 
significant degree, been solved.  Lynching is no longer a significant 
concern.73  Formal legal impediments, like the exclusion of African 
Americans from juries, have been removed.74  Thanks to the Supreme 
Court, accused people have many more rights, importantly including the 
right to a lawyer.75  The Court has also declared unconstitutional some 
laws, like some anti-loitering statutes, that allowed police to abuse their 
discretion.76  And in addition to being a law professor, I am a former 
prosecutor.77  There are many minority actors in the criminal justice system, 
including police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, jurors, judges, and 
significantly, lawmakers.78 
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73 Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 840 
(1994). 
74 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (declaring unconstitutional a prosecutor’s use 
of race-based peremptory challenges). 
75 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (declaring that the Sixth Amendment 
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76 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (invalidating Chicago’s gang 
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77 See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 (2009). 
78 See Nathaniel R. Jones, For Black Males and American Society - The Unbalanced 
Scales of Justice: A Costly Disconnect, 23 CAP. U.L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1994) (describing 
progress in increased appointment of black judges and hiring of black police officers). 
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How does the celebratory tradition deal with the higher rate of 
incarceration of African Americans and with other racial disparities in 
criminal justice?  Here, in an odd way, it remains celebratory. 
The celebratory tradition identifies the principle race and crime 
problem as under-enforcement.79  The victims who merited the attention of 
criminal justice in the bad old days were almost exclusively white.  Police 
and prosecutors were largely unconcerned about black-on-black or white-
on-black crime.80  Thus, the fact that there are so many black people in 
prison is, strangely enough, good news; all this law enforcement focus on 
the African-American community is reparation for the days when crimes 
against blacks went unanswered.  Randall Kennedy argues that “the 
principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to criminal 
matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of the law.”81 
Law enforcement, in this story, is a public good.  For a group to 
complain about having too much of it would be like complaining it had too 
many schools or too many parks. 
This narrative is also easy to caricature.  In the academy, I’ve explored 
it in two contexts—first, in the aforementioned review of Randall 
Kennedy’s Race, Crime, and the Law.82  More recently, in promoting my 
own book, Let’s Get Free,83 I’ve had a series of debates with elected 
prosecutors across the country.84  We have discussed whether the work that 
prosecutors do is consistent with social and racial justice.  The prosecutors 
I’ve debated, many of whom are African-American, all claimed that their 
work is in the best interest of black people, even when that work includes 
locking up many blacks.  These prosecutors have identified a different main 
race problem than mass incarceration.  They, like Kennedy, believe that the 
principle problem remains the under-protection of law and, specifically. the 
disproportionate number of victims of violent crime, especially homicide, 
who are African-American.85 
IV. SYMBOLIC VERSUS MATERIAL PROGRESS 
My purpose here is to set out these competing narratives rather than to 
choose between them.  We should note, however, that they seem impossible 
                                                          
79 See KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 19. 
80 Id. at 60-75. 
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82 Butler, supra note 72. 
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84 See, e.g., Butler and Barkow Discuss the Role of Prosecutors in Social and Racial 
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to reconcile.  They cannot both be true.  If the “New Jim Crow” theorists 
are correct, and the mass incarceration of blacks is simply the latest 
manifestation of racial subordination, conditions are worse than (or at least 
equally as bad as) they have ever been.  The depressing statistics about the 
number of African Americans who are locked up and other extreme racial 
disparities seem to bear this out. 
On the other hand, most people probably would say that an African 
American has a better chance of receiving a fair trial in 2010 than he or she 
would have had in 1910.  It seems undeniable that the racial climate has 
improved over the last one hundred years. 
Can racial justice in criminal law be better and worse at the same time? 
In her widely cited article, “Race, Reform, and Retrenchment,” Professor 
Kimberlé Crenshaw provides a useful and nuanced way of thinking about 
two kinds of racial progress: symbolic and material.86  Though Crenshaw 
wrote about constitutional law rather than criminal law, her analysis 
provides a helpful template for assessing the evolution of race, crime, and 
the law. 
Crenshaw argues that the Supreme Court’s civil rights cases benefit 
African Americans but, at the same, time make further material gains more 
difficult to obtain.  She explains that during the Jim Crow era, blacks were 
faced with two types of oppression: “symbolic subordination” and “material 
subordination.”87  Symbolic subordination includes the states’ respective 
efforts to reinforce a racist ideology of black inferiority by formally 
refusing to provide social and political equality to blacks.88  Material 
subordination is the actual economic subordination created by 
discriminatory policies and by the hegemonic racial hierarchy supported by 
the status quo.89  Crenshaw argues that the Supreme Court has been highly 
effective in ending symbolic subordination, but has had only limited 
success in ending material subordination.90 
With regard to race and crime, symbolic victories have been few and 
far between.  This is not because the Supreme Court approves of race-based 
criminal laws but rather because most criminal statutes have been facially 
race-neutral for generations.  Racial disparities have not been caused by 
discriminatory statutes; instead, such results have been achieved through 
the racialized exercise of discretion, including selective enforcement by 
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87 Id. at 1376-79. 
88 Id. at 1377. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1378-79. 
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police departments, selective prosecution, and selective sentencing by 
judges. 
For example, the men convicted in Moore v. Dempsey,91 Powell v. 
Alabama,92 and Brown v. Mississippi93—outrageous examples of Jim Crow 
justice—were all charged under racially neutral criminal laws.  Likewise, 
the anti-loitering laws, which were abusively applied to African Americans 
as described in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, were facially race-
neutral.94 
As I noted earlier, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to disturb this 
broad discretion, even when it is demonstrated to have racially skewed 
results.  Black criminal defendants do obtain some of the normative benefits 
cited by Crenshaw.  Minorities gained when the Court overturned those 
criminal laws that were facially discriminatory, such as the laws 
criminalizing anti-miscegenation invalidated in McLaughlin v. Florida95 
and Loving v. Virginia.96  Moreover, African-American defendants have 
benefited from the stigma against racism that the Supreme Court’s civil 
rights cases have helped to create. 
Yet material progress—the reduction, say, of racial disparities—has 
not been the result.  In a way, the success of the civil rights litigation in the 
Supreme Court may be partly to blame.  Crenshaw notes that formal 
neutrality has hindered the civil rights movement’s ability to make further 
advances.97  The abolition of most facially discriminatory policies gives 
credence to the theory (more aspirational than actualized) that America is 
essentially a meritocratic society.98 
Because race matters less in the law, it is thought by many to matter 
less in everyday life.  Thus, factors other than the law are looked for to 
explain sub-standard black achievement—factors like culture or even 
genetics.  This narrative harms African-American suspects because it 
diminishes the significance of race and racism.  Pointing to facially 
                                                          
91 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923) (involving black defendants charged with murder and 
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discriminatory policies was an effective way for blacks to prove that the 
system was inherently oppressive; now that the “Whites Only” signs have 
been taken down, it is more difficult for African Americans to explain their 
experience, therefore making claims of racial subordination less credible to 
people who accept these dominant narratives. 
V. ACKNOWLEDGING THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 
In this Symposium, Professor Ronald Allen spoke about the political 
trend, during the 1970s, of running against the Court.99  Now, the Court, 
rather than the politics, has changed.  We have witnessed the decline of the 
optimism of the Great Society, and its criminal justice correlate, the 
rehabilitative ideal. 
Thus, for the problem of mass incarceration, relief from the Supreme 
Court will come unexpectedly, like the results in Booker100 and Apprendi,101 
rather than as the product of public interest litigation designed to bring the 
Court around.  Groups like the NAACP and ACLU came late to 
recognizing mass incarceration as a race problem and a human rights 
problem, and thus missed the days of a more receptive Supreme Court.  I 
consult on litigation strategy with some civil rights organizations, and their 
basic strategy is not to bring litigation, especially in federal court.  No one, 
for example, thinks this is a good time to ask the Court to declare racial 
profiling unconstitutional.  Even if the composition of the Court becomes 
more liberal, the weight of the precedent of the Burger, Rehnquist, and 
Roberts Courts is so daunting that it is difficult to imagine a welcoming 
climate in the foreseeable future.  One exception might be the death 
penalty, where the Court is arguably more receptive to concerns about 
fairness.102 
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Charles Ogletree, among other scholars, has observed that the Warren 
Court, in its famed criminal procedure cases, was making advances in racial 
justice as much as criminal procedure.103  Many of the litigants in these 
cases, including Mr. Miranda104 and Mr. Terry,105 were African-American 
or Latino.  Significantly, however, the Court rarely discussed race in its 
criminal procedure opinions.  Its racial justice work was covert and 
formally color-blind.  Now even these “down low” kinds of interventions 
seem absent from the Court’s criminal jurisprudence. 
The central race and crime problem in the next one hundred years will 
be the efficacy of dealing with race and crime problems through color-blind 
law and policy.  In the post-racial era, is it even possible to fix problems 
that are inextricably linked to racial subordination?  The increase in racial 
disparities in incarceration can be attributed mainly to selective 
enforcement of the drug laws.  Again, this enforcement is “discriminatory” 
in the sense that there is no evidence that African Americans 
disproportionately commit drug offenses.106  The Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence, which requires a discriminatory intent, and its criminal 
procedure jurisprudence, which reifies law enforcement discretion, make 
this race and crime problem exceedingly difficult to address through civil 
rights litigation. 
There are, in addition, some crimes that blacks do commit 
disproportionately.107  For these crimes, the issue of whether race should be 
considered in assessing responsibility and punishment remains fraught.  
Blacks do not commit crimes because they are black.  Their 
overrepresentation among some classes of offenders is attributable to social 
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and environmental conditions such as poverty,108 miserable schools,109 
broken families,110 lack of access to health care,111 and even lead 
poisoning.112  All of these factors are in turn linked to racial subordination.  
If the law does not recognize this fundamental truth, if its remedies are all 
color-blind, then the symptoms are treated, but the disease remains.  For a 
painful disease, a patient might be satisfied with treatment of symptoms; 
she might feel better, even if she has not been cured.  Maybe this 
“improvement” is what the celebratory narrative celebrates. 
Yet the disease remains.  It metastasizes.  This is the racial 
subordination that the “New Jim Crow” storytellers focus on.  The disease 
cannot be cured unless it is diagnosed and treated.  This would mean race-
conscious remedies in criminal justice.  We have such remedies in other 
areas of the law, for example employment and education, because we 
understand that color-blind solutions will perpetuate the status quo.  Their 
legal status, however, is relentlessly contested, and they are politically 
unpopular.  They do not seem to be the wave of the future.  President 
Obama, criticized about the high rate of African-American unemployment, 
said, “I can’t pass laws that say ‘I’m just helping black folks.’”113  He 
asserted that his overall fixes to the economy would benefit all, including 
African Americans.114  The “rising tide will lift all boats” remedy also 
seems to be the prevailing view on race and crime: improved access to 
health care, more jobs, improved education, elimination of “mandatory 
minimum sentences,” and other means of restoring discretion to judges—all 
these will make things better for people of color in the criminal justice 
system.  If the “New Jim Crow” school is correct, however, race will 
continue to confound criminal justice for the next one hundred years, or 
however long it takes to achieve explicit racial justice interventions in 
criminal justice. 
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On the bicentennial of the United States Constitution, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall reflected on the legal progress that the civil rights 
movement helped to achieve.  Justice Marshall explained that, looking 
back, he saw victories, but looking forward, he saw more challenges: 
What is striking is the role legal principles have played throughout America’s history 
in determining the condition of Negroes.  They were enslaved by law, emancipated by 
law, disenfranchised and segregated by law; and, finally, they have begun to win 
equality by law. . . .  Thus, in this bicentennial year, we may not all participate in the 
festivities with flag-waving fervor.  Some may more quietly commemorate the 
suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what was wrong 
with the original document, and observe the anniversary with hopes not realized and 
promises not fulfilled.”115 
The experience of the last one hundred years teaches us that racial 
progress in criminal justice is not inevitable, but it is possible, at least in 
some limited sense.  Whether racial justice can be accomplished in a legal 
and political climate that rebuffs race discourse may still be an open 
question at the Journal’s bicentennial in 2110.  In the meantime, in 2010, 
nearly one million African Americans languish in prison, and millions more 
under some other form of criminal supervision. 
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